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ABSTRA CT 
 
 
This article argues that retirement income provision in Canada is built on gendered 
assumptions, which produce material disadvantage for women. These inequalities are 
being exacerbated by current neoliberal trends towards the ‘marketization’ and 
individualization of pension provision, supported by tax, securities and corporate 
legal norm s. The argument is developed using recent legislative changes to the 
operation of the Canada Pension Plan and recent developments in the regulation of 
mutual funds in Ontario as case studies. The article concludes by sketching out some 
possible points of departure for feminist interventions in pension privatization 
debates. 
 T 
INTR O DUC TI ON : GEN DER AN D RETIREME NT IN C OME IN 
CANADA 
 
 
HIS ARTICLE uses recent reforms to retirement income policies in 
Canada as a site for examining aspects of the material impact of 
neoliberal restructuring on Canadian women, as well as the role of 
law in furthering this agenda. The argument of the article is 
developed by first demonstrating that the Canadian pension 
framework, outlined briefly below, has been and continues to be 
fundamentally gendered, both in its impact on individual women and 
in the categories of analysis that are used to undergird the system. 
Second, it is argued that this ‘genderedness’ is being intensified in 
the current era of economic restructuring, such that many women are 
being adversely materially affected. This is occurring because of 
political choices that are being made, not just in Canada, to 
‘marketize’ pension policy, that is, to link it even more closely to 
the operation of financial markets. Two specific examples, (1) 
reforms to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and (2) legal treatment of 
mutual funds, will be described. One conclusion to be drawn from 
these examples is that the gendered repositioning occasioned by 
neoliberalism varies across class and sexuality. Thus, the shift to 
financial markets, accompanied as it has been by the ambiguous 
results of gender-oriented activism in political debate about the 
CPP described below, suggests that feminist scholars may need to 
 both reconsider their focus on the welfare state as the locus of 
materialist emancipatory politics (Fraser, 1998) and pay close 
attention to the legal regimes that facilitate this market-oriented 
restructuring. 
It should be pointed out, of course, that it is not only by means of pension 
reform that the Canadian state is being restructured in accordance with 
neoliberal principles, with gendered implications. The research presented in 
this article is part of a larger collaborative project1 which is investigating the 
implementation of privatizing policies in a variety of social and legal arenas 
in Canada, such as labour markets, family and welfare policies, tax policy, 
immigration, criminal justice, health policy and reproductive choice and 
technologies. The particular focus of the project is the role of law in 
privatization, both in terms of the myriad ways in which law and legal 
regulation are implicated in this economic and social restructuring, and 
also assessing the possibilities for using law in progressive ways to 
counter the gender disadvantage which it is argued is occurring. 
 
RETIREME N T I N C O ME PR O VISI ON I N C A N A D A 
 
In a number of countries, retirement income policies tend to involve a 
mixture of ‘public’ and ‘private’ provision, and thus to reflect the 
interdependence of state and market. In Canada, retirement policy is 
usually characterized as having three ‘tiers’. The first tier is represented by a 
universal state benefit, known as the Old Age Security Program.2 Funded 
 from general revenue, this is meant as an anti-poverty measure and it is 
both taxable and repayable, above a threshold amount , by the more well-
off. The second, the CPP, has been since 1966 a publicly administered 
‘paygo’ plan (where the contributions of today’s workers support today’s 
pensioners) from which all workers, and in some cases their spouses and 
survivors, will receive benefits. These benefits are financed by mandatory 
contributions from employers and employees, based on a percentage of 
income. In the ‘income replacement’ language of pension policy, CPP 
benefits are pitched so as to replace about 25 percent of pre-retirement 
income, up to the Canadian average income of C$35,800 (1997 figures).3 
The third tier is composed of a mixture of employer-sponsored pension 
plans (RPPs), and individual ‘registered retirement savings plans’(RRSPs). 
With respect to the former, it should be pointed out that employers are not 
required to provide pension plans for their employees. In the latter, 
employees voluntarily deposit money in a variety of investment vehicles 
provided by financial institutions, and most notably in Canada by the 
mutual fund sector. Such investment is facilitated by the fact that 
employees no longer make contributions to CPP beyond the average 
wage (Deaton, 1989: 228–9). While Canada is one of the ‘developed’ 
countries that has relied most heavily on the labour and financial 
markets to provide retirement income for its citizens (Esping-Anderson, 
1990; Orloff, 1993), the state and its laws have been implicated in these 
tiered retirement sectors at all levels. Thus, the state accomplishes the 
 direct provision of income through the OAS, the collection of CPP 
contributions and, until recently, lending out the modest surplus in the 
CPP fund to provincial (or local) governments at below-market interest 
rates, the regulation of employer-sponsored plans and the provision of 
generous tax deductions to individuals sheltering income in RRSPs. 
 
T H E G E N D ERE D L O G I C O F PE N SI ON S 
 
Retirement pensions may be understood as a form of social insurance against 
risk, in this case the risk of outliving one’s material resources when other 
ways of accessing income are less tenable (Rose, 1996; Sohrab, 1996). 
Understood as social insurance, they were one of the lynchpins of the post-
Second World War welfare state, which attempted in a variety of ways to 
secure the ‘pension promise’. Yet in most welfare states the capacity to access 
this insurance against poverty at an advanced age derives not primarily 
from being a citizen of a particular polity but either from a prior 
connection to the paid labour market or from being in a familial 
relationship with, or a survivor of, a wage earner (Donnelly, 1993; Orloff, 
1993). Both the second and third tiers of Canada’s retirement policy, as 
well as the GIS and Spouse’s Allowance components of OAS, are linked 
in various ways to wage earning or family relationships. This point implies 
that conceptually, as well as in practice, the distribution of the risk of being 
materially disadvantaged in old age will vary across gender and sexuality, 
since women’s differential relationship to the paid labour market reflects 
 their particular role in social reproduction (MacDonald, 1998). 
With respect to the Canadian labour market, Townson has documented 
extensively the phenomenon whereby women are much more likely than 
men to be employed in ‘nonstandard’ work, which she defines as part-time 
work, self-employment, temporary work, or multiple jobs with a series of 
employers (Townson, 1997: 2–3). In 1994, for example, 40 percent of women, 
as compared with 27 percent of men, worked in nonstandard jobs (1997: 13). 
Specifically, 24 percent of all women workers compared with only 8 percent 
of men were in part-time jobs, most often in the retail trade and other 
consumer services (1997: 5, 8). This point is one not only about labour 
market participation rates but also about pay. Thus, ‘the average earnings 
of all women, including those who worked part-time or in other types of 
work which was not full-time, full-year, were $20,219 in 1995 which was 
still only 65% of the average earnings of all men at $31,053’ (1997: 16). The 
impact on the ability to make contributions to labour market-based pension 
schemes, and to receive benefits on the basis of contributions, is obvious. 
As Orloff expresses it (1993: 314), ‘Women’s inferior status in the work force 
means that women are disproportionately disadvantaged when benefits 
reflect work related inequality’. In terms of family status, on the other 
hand, Statistics Canada reports that, in 1993, 56 percent of all senior 
women living alone or with unrelated persons had ‘low incomes’.4 As 
Leonard and Nichols put it (1994: 9–11), ‘for the majority of women, their 
marital status will determine their material conditions in old age, since 
 poverty is far more pronounced among single elders than among married 
couples’. McDonald’s 1997 study of retired widows, who ‘constitute 
approximately 47% of the senior population’, and 49% of whom ‘lived 
below the low income cut-offs of Statistics Canada’, leads her to reinforce 
the claim that ‘married women are one husband away from poverty’ 
(McDonald, 1997b: vi–vii). 
Further, Townson claims (1995: 6) that there are significant differences 
between men and women in attitudes to retirement. In a survey she 
completed of the ‘retirement readiness’ of Canadian women at midlife (i.e. 
ages 45–54), ‘women seemed much less certain than men about the age at 
which they would retire’. She argues that ‘the fact that 41% of women aged 
45–54 have no specific retirement date in mind may reflect their lack of 
financial planning for retirement as well as uncertainty about their financial 
future and what measures they will have to take to secure it’. And of course, 
in a demographic sense the extent of the risk of inadequate pension income is 
gendered, in that life expectancy rates ensure that women will be dependent 
on pension income for a greater proportion of their lives. 
 
N E O LIBERALI SM, RISK A N D LAW 
 
In the current, now well-entrenched, era of economic restructuring known 
as neoliberalism, the gendered exposure to risk that pension logic represents 
has intensified. This restructuring, which has been well documented  in 
many developed and developing countries and across a variety of social 
 policy fronts, is signified by the ascendancy of the market over and inside the 
state, with policy outcomes being determined by the market rather than by 
central planning (Brodie, 1997; Miller and Rose, 1990). Strategies of 
commodification (exposing social provisioning to a market delivery 
system), retrenchment (removing various welfare benefits provided by the 
state) and deregulation (dismantling the particular legal apparatus by 
which the state governed, or ‘intervened in’ the economy ) are all said to be 
implicated in the phenomenon (Brodie, 1997). These strategies are 
accompanied by a shift to what Rose (1996: 342) calls ‘a politics of risk’, 
whereby individuals are being required increasingly to take responsibility 
for their own and their families’ financial and personal security into the 
future, with markets for risk management products emerging in a variety of 
areas. Despite neoliberal claims to gender neutrality in these restructuring 
efforts (Cossman, forthcoming), a political economy that relies increasingly 
on the market to produce social policy may well have a differential effect 
across genders, given women’s often more fragile connection to labour and 
other markets and greater dependence on the state to recognize the 
financial implications of their decommodified labour. This requires close 
attention to the gender politics of risk that neoliberalism entails, not only in 
terms of obvious issues of material well-being in the form of social security 
benefits payable and contributions exacted (Sohrab, 1996), but also in terms 
of the actual operating practices of a market based delivery system. 
Social theorists who posit the shift to the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992; Ericson 
and Haggerty, 1997) tend to see it as accompanied by techniques of 
 governance (Hunt, 1999: 9–10) emphasizing actuarialism, targeting, 
‘privatized prudentialism’ (O’Malley, 1992) and ‘governance of the self’. 
Thus, traditional legal forms of governance are decentred in the analysis, 
and  fragmented into  codes of practice, self-regulation, or  regulation  by  
contractual term (Cotterrell, 1995: 280; Rittich, 1998; Rose, 1996: 350–1). 
However, it remains import ant to track changes in legal forms of governance 
in neoliberalism, and to clarify the extent to which they are implicated in 
producing inequalities of risk distribution (Ericson and  Haggerty, 1997: 
120–3; Pearce and  Tombs, 1996: 449). If market norms are in the 
ascendancy, the continued relevance of the insight of critical legal scholars, 
among others, that law and legal norms construct  and  shape  markets and  
market  institutions in  distinct  ways is obvious (Blackburn , 1999: 6–8; 
Gordon , 1987; Pearce and Tombs, 1996: 432). In terms of pensions 
specifically, Esping-Anderson (1990: 79) has pointed out that ‘pensions 
account for more than 10% of GD P in many contemporary nations’. 
Accordingly, debates have taken place in many countries, Canada among 
them, about the need for market solutions to alleged problems caused for the 
welfare state of unfavourable demographic projections, involving a 
declining workforce and an aging population. Institutions such as the World 
Bank have targeted pension systems in economies in transition as in need of a 
privatizing overhaul (Blackburn , 1999: 14–15). The most radical and oft-cited 
example of a shift to a financial market-based pension system has occurred in 
Chile. Here a pay-as-you-go system was abandoned in favour of a scheme 
requiring workers to pay 10 percent of their income a year into an individual 
 retirement account of their choice, which they control and invest as they wish 
(Fazio and Riesco, 1997). Similar proposals in the United States, involving so 
called USAs (universal savings account s) have been floated by the Clinton 
administration. Such schemes have obvious material advantages to  private 
providers  of  investment  advice  and  transactions  (Blackburn ,  1999:  7–8; 
Deaton, 1989). It is in this international context that policy and legal changes 
in two elements of Canada’s retirement income pyramid are discussed in the 
remainder of this article. These are (1) recent debates about the viability of the 
Canada Pension Plan and (2) the changing regulation of mutual funds.5 The 
focus of the discussion will be on how these developments have produced the 
material repositioning of Canadian women, as well as how legal forms of 
governance are implicated in this repositioning. Even more significantly, the 
contrast that will become visible between developments in relation to CPP as 
opposed to mutual funds suggests clearly that discussion of the trend towards 
privatization in pension provision needs to be more explicit about how the 
implications vary according to class position. 
 
 
T H E G E N D ER P O LITI CS O F C PP REF O RM 
 
The legislative changes to the operation of CPP that took place in Canada in 
the fall of 1997 (CPP Investment Board Act) were preceded by widespread 
debate at various levels of government, as well as by public and ‘expert’ 
 consultations. This round of debates is usually taken to have begun in early 
1994, when the Chief Actuary’s periodic report on the finances of the CPP, 
required by its governing legislation concluded that ‘the recession and higher 
than anticipated disability claims would necessitate increasing contribution 
rates higher than previously expected’ (Townson, 1996: 30). The federal and 
provincial governments issued a discussion paper in the mid-1990s and held 
public consultations across Canada,6 in which a ‘crisis of unsustainability’ of 
the CPP was asserted. As is demonstrated in more detail in the discussion to 
follow, the result of these public and parliamentary debates was that while 
government proposals to reduce the amount s of benefits payable from CPP 
were largely successfully opposed, contribution rates were increased. 
Meanwhile, the investment of CPP funds in the financial markets rather 
than in government bond s, with the objective of increasing returns to the 
fund, was the centrepiece of the legislative changes. In feminist activist 
terms, this was an ambiguous result, since the most immediately 
regressive aspects of the proposals, in relation to benefit issues, were 
successfully resisted by the leftwing politicians, seniors’ organizations and 
women’s organizations who spoke against them in consultation sessions. Yet 
the more long-term material and discursive effects of the legislative changes, 
which included destabilizing the redistributive aspects of the Plan, 
valorizing market-based solutions to pension provision and introducing 
norms of private law to support this, were far less contested. Four key 
themes will be isolated from these public and parliamentary reform 
 debates, as they illuminate both how neoliberal practice becomes persuasive 
and how gendered material disadvantage was thereby intensified. 
 
 
DEMOGRA PHICS 
 
As in other countries, the reforms to CPP that were proposed and discussed 
were premised on a governmental claim, supported by many pension experts 
(Pesando, 1997; Robson, 1996; House of Commons, 1997e), of the 
unsustainability of CPP in its then existing form. This claim was based 
primarily on demographic projections of a declining workforce whose 
contributions could not meet escalating claims by increasing numbers of 
pensioners at the existing contribution levels. An aspect of this argument 
was the claim that the problem with CPP was that ‘early generations did 
not pay enough’ into the Plan relative to the amount s of benefits they 
were currently receiving (Battle, 1996: 6–7). As the Federal/Provincial 
Consultations Repor t put it, ‘The basic challenge facing Canadians is one 
of fairness and equity. For the past 30 years, Canadians have paid much 
less than the benefits they are receiving, or will receive, are worth . Future 
generations will be asked to pay considerably more for the very same 
benefits’ (Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat, 
1996a: 9). This opposition between the interests of young workers and 
seniors was used by some expert commentators to mount a more general 
onslaught on the redistributive aspects of public pension provision. Thus, 
 for example, Robson (1996: 25) argued that ‘These transfers from young to 
old cannot be excused by casting the CPP as though its primary purpose 
were redistribution rather than income replacement. . . The CPP provides 
benefits similar to those available from private pension plans and 
insurance policies but does so in a way that is tilted dramatically against 
today’s children’. 
The solutions proposed by the government in its initial information paper 
included a combination of ‘early increases in contribution rates and reduced 
benefits or reduced access to benefits’ (Robson, 1996: 10). The demographic 
premise on which these proposals were made was contested by left-leaning 
politicians and social policy analysts mainly by pointing to the relative 
contribution rates of Canadian workers vis-a-vis workers in European 
countries, where more robust public pension systems, requiring higher 
contribution rates, were assumed to exist. Yet it is clear that the 
demographic analysis on which the panic about unsustainability was based 
was intrinsically gendered in two ways. First, it took no account of the issue 
of women’s unpaid work, so that the only work that counted for these 
demographic calculations was ‘paid’ work (Waring, 1988/90). Nor did it 
acknowledge the changing nature of paid work more generally (McDonald, 
1997a; McDaniel, 1997). The terms of the debate obscured a broader 
analysis that would recognize not just that there may be fewer workers in 
the paid labour market in the future, but that those workers’ earnings are not 
growing and that workers, especially women, tend no longer to be in 
continuous employment (McDaniel, 1997). This failure to problematize 
 the nature of the labour market beyond a focus on a declining number of 
workers silenced or discounted a variety of alternative political solutions 
posited by alternative definitions of the ‘problem’ of CPP. These would 
include: raising above the average wage the ceiling whereby contributions 
to CPP are still required to be made, thereby increasing the flow of 
contributions from higher-income earners; intensifying political efforts at 
job creation or other ways of increasing labour force participation, 
especially women’s participation; removing or decreasing the tax deduction 
that favours investing in private RRSPs, mostly by male workers (Young, 
1997) or, even more radically, problematizing the assumed link between 
labour markets and pension entitlements. Despite the interventions of 
women’s organizations like the National Action Committee on the Status of 
Women (NAC) (House of Commons, 1997f), the political solutions 
ultimately forged were based on a refusal to recognize the gendered nature of 
the labour market. 
 
 
BENEFITS AND CON TRI BUTI ON S 
 
The benefits received by women from CPP are typically lower than those 
received by men, since their income-related contributions are lower. 
However, CPP’s coverage of part-time workers and recognition of time out 
of the paid labour force because of family responsibilities in the assessment 
of benefits,7 as well as the availability of spousal pension sharing and survivor 
 benefits, may all be seen as better or worse attempts to recognize the 
gendered material risk faced by women. The persistence of a traditional 
discourse of family here, of course, has meant that women in lesbian 
relationships are unable to qualify for the benefits of pension sharing or 
survivorship. However, this issue is under active political reconsideration, in 
part as a result of successful legal challenges on the basis of Charter-granted 
equality rights8 (Rosenberg; Young, 1999; McCarthy, 1999). 
Meanwhile, the 1997 legislative changes have resulted in: (1) an increase in 
contribution rates from 5.85 percent of wages, up to the average wage in 1997, 
to 9.9 percent by the year 2003, at which the rate will be then held steady; (2) 
freezing the year’s basic exemption (the amount below which no 
contributions are required) at $3,500 of income, instead of being indexed to 
wages. In contrast, as mentioned earlier, the maximum amount at which 
contributions are no longer required to be made was not raised from 
$35,800; (3) the ultimate retirement benefit to be based on an average of the 
last five years’ yearly maximum pensionable earnings (YMPE), instead of 
the last three years;9 (4) a reduction of the maximum death benefit payable 
to survivors to $2,500, down from $3,500 which was likewise formerly 
indexed to wages. Collectively, these changes will adversely affect those 
women whose participation in the labour force is low-paying and fragile 
and will reduce the distributive features of CPP. As Townson points out, 
lower-income workers may find it hard to assimilate such a sharp increase 
in contributions over a short period since they pay contributions on the 
 whole of their income, as opposed to those earning higher than average 
earnings, who contribute only on a portion. The difficulty will be 
exacerbated for the self-employed, who have to fund both sets of 
contributions themselves (Townson, 1997: 61–4). Freezing the year’s basic 
exemption will over time draw more very low income workers into the 
contributions requirement (Townson, 1997: 62; NAC in House of 
Commons, 1997f: 1625). Reducing the death benefit payable to survivors is 
also more likely to negatively affect women, given gendered survival 
figures. Basing the benefit on the last five years of earnings as opposed to 
three will result in lower pensions generally, with adverse effects for 
those who rely mainly on CPP for retirement income. 
 
STRA TEGIC USE OF GENDER-BASED ARGUM ENTS 
 
Yet it would not be true to say that the consequences for women of the 
government’s proposals were ignored entirely in the debate. In fact they were 
highlighted in responses across the political spectrum. Thus, labour 
spokespersons opposed any reductions in benefits on the ground s that ‘they 
would adversely affect low-income Canadians, fundamentally alter the social 
insurance side of the plan and adversely affect women’ 
(Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat, 1996a: 22). 
Liberal Parliamentary Secretary Valeri referred in parliamentary debate to 
the ‘gender analysis that was put forward that showed that in fact women 
 would receive $2.56 of benefits for every dollar of contribution’ (House of 
Common s, 1997b). Meanwhile, the official opposition [Reform] party 
leader, Preston Manning, said 
 
When I look at the bill I am reminded that we are dealing with the principal 
source of income of people who are no longer in a position to add to their 
income. All of us know of middle aged [and] elderly women who invested most 
of their lives in raising children in the home and who entered the so-called 
official workplace . . . late in life or not at all and therefore qualify for little or 
no CPP benefits . . . [We] should keep the needs of these women uppermost as 
we consider pension reform. (House of Common s, 1997a) 
 
The latter position certainly evinces a concern for that group of women who 
are most disadvantaged by the enduring link between labour markets and 
pension entitlements. However, less consideration was extended to those 
women who remain in the paid labour force in marginal and insecure 
positions. No suggestion was made that it might be worth examining the 
possibilities of restructuring the labour market to allow the enhanced 
participation of women (Fraser, 1998). Nor did the solution that was offered 
by the Reform Party to mitigate this disadvantage involve an uncoupling or a 
deemphasis of the link between pension entitlements and labour force 
participation. It actually did support dismantling the CPP entirely, but in 
order to move to individual retirement savings account s to which employers 
and employees would contribute. Thus the Reform Party (Ablonczy) called 
 for 
moving . . . to a fully funded system based on individual account s while 
protecting the benefits of current seniors. This means that individuals will own 
all the assets in their account and their retirement benefits will be 
substantially greater. When they die their children and their spouse will 
inherit the capital. This would go a long way toward eliminating poverty for 
elderly widows, for example. . . Countries from around the world are 
following the example of Chile in moving from publicly to privately owned 
and managed pensions. . . (House of Common s, 1997a) 
 
While this proposal was ultimately unsuccessful in this iteration of the 
debate, it should be noted that the Reform Party’s position is a clear 
rejection  of a socially redistributive element to  the CPP. The association  
of a market-based pension delivery system with enhanced financial 
autonomy should be closely examined by feminists, especially if it is 
assumed, as the Reform Party did, that women will be recipients of 
pension income not in their own right, but by the inheritance from their 
families of market-based pension gains. Further, as Philipps (forth coming) 
points out in the context of recent developments in Canadian tax policy, 
one of the ironies of neoliberal discourse in Canada is the possibility of 
appropriation of feminist knowledges and arguments to further political 
agendas which are not typically in sympathy with feminist objectives. 
In the end, what are we to make of the fact that the more radical policy 
options that were initially put forward by the government’s information 
 paper (eliminating survivor benefits altogether, only partially indexing 
pensions, reducing the rate at which CPP benefits would replace income 
from 25 percent down to 22.5 percent, raising the age of entitlement, 
reducing the number of non-working or low-income years that could be 
dropped out) would have had even worse consequences for women but 
ultimately were not enacted (Federal/Provincial/Territorial Governments of 
Canada, 1996b)? Is this to be read as a success for the feminist activists, 
such as the representatives of NAC who appeared before the SCF (to 
which the CPP bill was referred after its second reading in parliament), or 
other women’s organizations who participated in the public consultations 
on CPP and focused primarily on the benefits proposals made by the 
government?10 While at first glance it may appear to be so in the sense that 
more regressive proposals were avoided, if taken in the context of the 
legislative reforms as a whole, there is little cause for satisfaction. This is 
because the price that was paid for maintaining benefits and access to 
benefits was precisely the ‘marketization’ of the CPP, as the following 
discussion demonstrates. 
 
 
INVESTMENT STRA TEGY AND FUND GOVERNANCE  
 
The chief innovation of the 1997 legislation was a shift to a more financial 
market-based investment strategy for CPP, with the aim of maximizing 
returns to the fund and building up its capital. This was widely viewed by 
 ‘business, labour and seniors groups’ as a compromise solution to the 
problems of the CPP’s so-called ‘unfunded liability’. Indeed, the consensus 
about the need for a shift to the financial markets extended to women’s 
organizations which ‘supported improved investment of the CPP fund’ 
(Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consulations Secretariat, 1996a: 22, 25). 
Previously, any surplus in the fund not needed to meet current obligations to 
pensioners had been lent to provincial governments at below-market 
interest rates to accomplish various public finance projects (Deaton, 1989: 
223–5). Following the passage of the CPP Investment Board Act, CPP funds 
are now being invested in the equity markets.11 A new investment board 
has been established to manage any amount s transferred to it ‘in the best 
interests of the contributor s and beneficiaries’ under the Act. It is to invest 
its assets ‘with a view to achieving a maximum rate of return, without 
undue risk of loss’ (s. 5). The attempts of labour spokespersons to advocate 
investment objectives such as ‘meeting economic goals for the country ’ or 
‘secondary objectives to promote economic development’ or ‘regional 
economic development’ (Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations 
Secretariat, 1996a: 36, 57) were roundly criticized by financial planners, 
investment dealers and pension experts who appeared in a special 
consultation session before the legislation was enacted. This latter position 
was support ed by the government in drafting the legislation. As in the Social 
Security debate in the US, a major concern expressed by some participants 
was the possibility for ‘government intervention’ in CPP investment 
 decisions (Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat, 
1996a: 36; Manning in House of Commons, 1997a). The legislative 
solution here was to allow the new CPP Investment Board to ‘hire 
qualified investment professionals  to  manage  the  day-today investment 
decisions at arm’s length from governments’ (House of Commons, 1997c: 
2699).12 
The tradeoff for minimizing ‘government intervention’ in the investment 
activity of the newly marketized CPP was a variety of governance norms 
drawn from corporate and trust law. These include a fiduciary duty to the 
Investment Board imposed on individual directors and officers who should 
have ‘proven financial ability or relevant work experience’, the ability to hire 
qualified investment professionals with discretionary author ity to manage 
the fund, and the requirement to invest according to a ‘prudent portfolio’ 
standard, as elaborated in a written, publicly available investment policy 
required by the draft regulations. As the legislation was being passed, the 
only issue of major debate with respect to the investment strategy had to do 
with whether the fund should be invested actively or passively (i.e. 
replicating an existing stock exchange index). The debate here centred on 
various pension funds’ experiences with index-based investing, along with a 
concern that this particular fund (estimated to be some C$60 billion by the 
year 2006) would be too large to make passive investing viable. In the end, the 
draft regulations require passive investing.13 In this sense, as the 
‘governmentality’ literature would suggest (Miller and Rose, 1990), a 
 financial market-based risk management strategy and the employment of 
financial ‘expertise’ accompanies the use of legal governance norms derived 
from corporate and trust law. These strategies are employed in an attempt to 
control the now enhanced market risk resulting from the turn to financial 
markets for pension funding. It should be noted, however, that the 
establishment of a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of contributor s 
and beneficiaries simply replicates, or submerges, the apparent interest 
group antagonisms that prompt ed the legislative changes in the first place. It 
also suggests that the way the Board operationalizes its obligation to act in 
the interests of the entire Canadian working population will be significant 
(Cooper, 1997). 
Meanwhile at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance 
review of the legislation after second reading, NAC had raised the issues of 
whether  (1)  the  investment  board  had  to  consist  entirely  of  financial 
professionals, or whether room should be made for representatives of CPP 
beneficiaries and (2) why there had been ‘no discussion of the possible use of 
ethical investment criteria’ for the fund (NAC in House of Commons, 1997f: 
1630). This attempt to broaden the base of participation in running the fund 
as well as its investment goals was vigorously and successfully resisted by 
pension experts. With respect to participation, all that the legislation 
ultimately requires is that there be a biennial public meeting in each 
participating province, but it does not embody the Senate Committee on 
Banking Trade and Commerce’s recommendation that at least one director 
of the fund attend. Instead the legislation (s. 52) requires only that ‘one or 
 more directors or officers’ attend to meet with any of the beneficiaries 
whose interests they are to maximize. In legislating for fund governance 
therefore, a singular interest in fund maximization, to be accomplished by 
using a circumscribed fiduciary obligation to govern low-visibility decision 
making was privileged, and articulated through a discourse of preventing 
‘government interference’, rather than of attempting to further 
democratic participation or accountability (Valverde et al., 1999: 29–30). 
 
 
C PP A N D N E O LIBERALI SM 
 
The outcome of the CPP debate suggests the ambiguities associated with a 
‘privatization’ discourse, since the result here was that the CPP would retain 
the features of mandatory labour market-wide contributions and the 
payment of defined benefits, but that funds would be raised in private equity 
markets to supplement contributions. Yet a move away from a commitment 
to collective responsibility for pension provision has clearly taken place 
(Guest, 1980/97: 293), as evidenced partly in the debate about benefit and 
contribution issues, and partly in the shift to a market-based investment 
strategy accompanied by governance norms drawing on risk management 
and fiduciary obligations, according significant discretionary authority to 
investment decision makers. A major discursive as well as material effect of 
the 1997 legislative changes was that returns from the financial markets were 
considered a preferable alternative to socialized reliance on other workers in 
 a pay-as-you-go system ( O’Malley, 1992: 259, 261). This discursive shift has 
implications for the future of a redistributive rationale for pension 
entitlements generally, which is likely to have further negative effects for 
women. A gendered example of the neoliberal attack on redistribution from 
workers to pensioners as the raison d’etre for pension policy can be 
found in the comment of Michael Walker, Executive Director of a 
prominent Canadian thinktank, the Frazer Institute, that ‘[U]nder the 
CPP women who live longer collect more in total benefits but do not pay 
higher premiums. This is, simply put, inequitable’. On being pressed 
further about this, Walker responded ‘You’re subsidizing the women’s 
pensions with the contributions of the men . . . that’s confusing an issue of 
subsidy with an issue of paying for people’s pensions. I don’t think we 
should be doing that either’ ( House of Common s, 1997d). As a result of 
the CPP legislation, pension contributors and recipients were transformed 
into stakeholders in an investment fund by means of discourses of 
financial rectitude, and individualized gender-neutral ‘fairness’, with little 
opportunity provided to render the ensuing decision making democratically 
accountable. 
 
 
M U T U AL F U N D RE GU LATI ON 
 
In the midst of the panic about the future of CPP, the significance of RRSPs 
to Canadian retirement planning is increasing. This phenomenon is 
 supported by federal government provision of favourable tax treatment to 
amount s invested in RRSPs (Young, 1997) as well as a decline in employer 
sponsored pension coverage (Townson, 1997). Up to a ceiling of some 
C$15,500 of income, amount s contributed to an RRSP may be deducted from 
income before calculating the tax payable. Further, tax payable on the income 
earned on these savings is deferred until the funds are withdrawn, although 
this can be before the individual retires. As Young has argued with respect to 
both occupational pension plans and RRSPs, investment patterns here are 
gendered, in the sense that women are less likely to work for large 
employers who offer pension plans and tend to have less ‘discretionary 
income’ to contribute to RRSPs (Donnelly, 1993; Young, 1997: 320–21). She 
also points out that the possibility for wage earners to contribute to spousal 
RRSPs (i.e. a transfer of funds into the plan of a lower-income spouse) 
reinforces traditional gender relations within families. Similarly, Townson 
reports that men, on average, contribute a smaller percentage of their 
average earnings to RRSPs than do women, but argues that this is because 
men are more likely than women to have employer-sponsored plans, which 
limit the amount s that can be contributed to an RRSP (Townson, 1995: 56, 
1997: 44). Statistics Canada reports that, overall, more men than women 
invest in this fashion and in greater amount s (Townson, 1995: 89). In 1993 
the average amount contributed by women was $2,931 compared with an 
average of $4,360 for men. Individuals in nonstandard jobs are also more 
likely to use retirement savings accumulated in RRSPs in advance of 
retirement, for financial support during periods of unemployment or when 
 withdrawing from the paid workforce because of family responsibilities 
(Townson, 1997: 49). A key point however is that ‘nearly half of all RRSP 
deductions are claimed by the 12.5% of tax filers with the highest incomes’ 
(Townson, 1997: 57; Dickinson, 1996: 189; Guest, 1980/97: 283). It is 
argued that foregone government revenue as a result of tax exemptions for 
private pension plans amount s to about $12 billion a year, ‘about 40% of 
the total cost of public pension programs such as OAS/G IS and the CPP’ 
(Guest, 1980/97: 283). 
Meanwhile the popularity of the mutual fund, a collective investment 
vehicle similar to a unit trust or managed investment, whose value is 
dependent on the value of the financial instruments it invests in, and which 
allows for diversification of investment risk, has increased dramatically in 
Canada in the last decade or so (Stromb erg, 1998: 24). Mutual fund assets 
stood at C$394 billion at the end of 1998, up from $30 billion in 1989. 
Seven million Canadian households hold at least one mutual fund 
(Senate, 1997: 5: 76). There are more than 1,300 mutual funds in Canada, 
sold by more than 80,000 registrants at brokers, mutual fund dealers, 
independent distributor s and banks. A recent report (Stromberg, 1998: 135) 
points out that ‘there are now more investment funds in Canada than there 
are stocks listed on Canadian stock exchanges’. 
This phenomenon has resulted in a dramatic upgrading of regulatory 
oversight of mutual fund operations, which has taken a variety of forms. The 
link between regulation of investment in mutual funds and saving for 
retirement has been acknowledged by David Brown, the current Chair of 
 the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the provincial government 
regulator of mutu al funds.14 In one of the first speeches of his tenure, given to 
the Investment Funds Institute of Canada in July 1998 he said, ‘At the 
present time we do not have the tools to cope with a serious market reversal. 
Nor would we have answers for investors whose savings comprise these 
billions of dollars as to why their retirement dreams may have been lost’. 
The regulatory initiatives that have been taken in Ontario over the last 
few years to reduce the market risk faced by individual pension investors 
include: the commissioning by the Canadian Securities Administrators, an 
umbrella organization for provincial securities commissions, of a member 
of the OSC to make recommendations for regulating investment funds 
(Stromb erg, 1995); the establishment of a selfregulatory organization – the 
Mutu al Fund Dealers Association (MFDA) – to govern mutual fund dealers 
selling produ cts to the public; new regulatory instruments governing sales 
practices engaged in by mutual funds (NI 81–105), and a simplified prospectus 
system for mutual funds (NI 81–101); a variety of enforcement initiatives 
targeted at mutual funds and their dealers, including a compliance review of 
23 mutual fund dealers conducted over a two-y ear period; and hearings 
against specific fund managers suspected of violating provisions of 
securities legislation and regulation. The regulatory infractions involved 
include failures to disclose conflicts of interest in advice-giving and 
inappropriate investment advice given to inexperienced investors (DeLellis, 
Mersch). These regulatory initiatives are premised on the recognition that 
 individuals saving for their retirement through RRSPs and mutual funds do 
not typically make investment decisions themselves but rely on intermediaries 
and financial ‘experts’ of one kind or another to do so for them. 
The recent frenzy of legal and regulatory activity has culminated to date in 
another report authored by Commissioner Stromberg, this time for Industry 
Canada (Stromb erg, 1998), which is oriented towards ‘consumer’ protection. 
This report advocates the recognition of what is described as the 
‘retailization’ of the financial marketplace, and specifically the diffuse 
nature of the market for investment products. One of its most striking 
features is the recommendation that individuals be offered the 
opportunity to learn how to manage investment risks, including the ‘risk 
inherent in being too conservative’, along with support for investor 
economic education at a young age in the interests of enhancing ‘wealth 
management’ (Stromb erg, 1998: 28; Appendix D: 2). In other word s, the 
report posits that future pensioners need to be educated to accept risks, and 
it is further observed that this education would ‘facilitate the 
implementation of a broader range of governmental initiatives in the area 
of pension and other retirement benefit programs including the increased 
privatization thereof’ (Stromberg, 1998: 68). Should these 
recommendations be adopted by regulatory authorities, they would 
clearly further a neoliberal agenda of individualized acceptance of market risk 
in pension provision. While these recommendations are presented, again, in 
gender-neutral terms, the data presented above on gender-based differences 
in RRSP investment suggest that women are less well positioned to generate 
 adequate retirement income by means of investment in mutual  funds. 
Furthermore, there is interesting empirical work to be done to investigate the 
extent to which individual investment strategies are gendered and how 
intermediaries construct the ‘risk profiles’ of their clients in accordance with 
selfregulatory codes. The feminist economics literature suggests, in general, 
that the ‘rational actor’ model of market decision making may itself be 
gendered (England, 1993; Ferber and Nelson, 1993). 
As a result of this regulatory activity, the legal relationship between 
investors and their financial intermediaries is in the process of being 
redefined. This is also occurring through the courts, in the context of civil 
actions launched by individual investors alleging breach of fiduciary duty 
(Hodgkinson v. Simms [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377). The risk of private 
investing is being actively reshaped by tax, securities and tort law. Indeed, 
a plurality of regulatory mechanisms, some familiar from private, corporate 
law contexts, and others staples of administrative regulation, are being 
pressed into the service of facilitating financial market-based retirement 
well-being for those who can afford to avail of it. The existence of this legal 
code, addressing issues of risk management and techniques of investor 
account ability (Condon , 1996; Rose, 1996: 350–1) amply demonstrates that 
this is not an unfettered market, but in fact relies on considerable legal 
resources to support it. Deregulation is not at all the order of the day in 
this sphere. Taking the CPP and mutual fund developments together, 
however, it is possible to see that the role of the state, through legal 
governance, is shifting towards structuring market risk and away from the 
 direct provision of financial benefits, which will have the effect of producing 
further material inequality. 
 
 
C ON C L USI ON : H O W SHO U L D FEMI N ISTS RESP ON D ? 
 
In its focus on individualized risk and its deemphasis of redistribution, the 
pension privatization debate in Canada is a classic example of what Rose calls 
the ‘death of the social’. Yet the consequences of this demise vary according 
to gender, sexuality and class position. Thus, the marketization of the CPP, 
illustrated by the investment strategy adopted and the inequitable increase in 
contribution  requirements, can  be contrasted  with  the tax revenue-based 
support of RRSP investment, which helps to ensure that wealthy workers 
will get wealthy pensions. All of this presents a dilemma for feminist 
political and legal strategizing, since feminists have historically relied on or 
exhorted the state to recognize and act upon the need for gender-sensitive 
decommodification. As Fraser puts it, the ‘welfare state is crucial for gender 
relations’ (1998: 55). Fraser herself argues that feminists need to abandon the 
effort to achieve two competing visions of the ‘feminist welfare state’, which 
she describes as the ‘universal breadwinner’ model and the ‘caregiver parity’ 
model. In the first, the universal breadwinner model, the goal is for women’s 
work lives to become the same as men’s, while the ideal of caregiver parity 
would ‘revalue feminine life patterns’.15 Fraser claims that neither can ensure 
 gender justice because neither fully integrates redistributive goals with 
recognition of gender difference. The universal breadwinner model 
‘valorizes men’s traditional sphere’, while the caregiver model would 
‘entrench gender disparities in income’ and institute a ‘mommy track’ 
(1998: 59). Rather, her own blueprint would advocate a third alternative to 
‘deconstruct the genderbased differentiation of breadwinning and 
caregiving’. Specifically, it would require restructuring the organization of 
work by ‘envisioning a society in which women’s current life-patterns are 
the norm for everyone’ (1998: 63–4). Thus, social and political institutions 
should be redesigned to ensure that men, like women, combine caregiving 
with breadwinning, and that the practical difficulties of doing this are 
eliminated. Translated into the pension context, this would likely require 
pension entitlements to be more fully cognisant of the need to fulfil both 
roles, the need to take time out of the paid labour force, the need to work 
part-time, the need to have careers flexible enough to accomodate 
workplace and caring labour, and in general to decrease the link between 
pensions and the paid labour market. 
The problem with this of course, is that the opportunity for feminists to 
push the welfare state in this direction (Donnelly, 1993) is receding under the 
onslaught of market-oriented policy making, bringing with it new 
inequalities of gender-based risk. As Rose puts it, ‘the state may no longer be 
assuming responsibility for the management of a whole variety of risks’ 
(1996: 338). So feminist strategizers face a real dilemma of whether to 
pursue efforts to reinvigorate the redistributive goals of the welfare state, 
 for example, by moving away from labour market-based benefits to 
universal ones, or on the other hand, to reorient themselves to engage with 
the increasing role played by the state in securing the control of market 
risk through legal and other governance mechanisms. A few, admittedly 
speculative, comments may be offered on this question. With respect to 
the former option, it would seem import ant not to abandon redistribution 
as a collective commitment, but rather to keep that normative goal alive. 
Part of the approach here may involve seeking to deconstruct the 
opposition often posed between redistribution and market norms, by 
pointing out, as some economists have argued, that markets may have a 
redistributive effect (Bromley, 1997). It may also be possible, in this era of 
‘post-social politics’ (O’Malley et al., 1997), to seek new rationales for 
redistribution. With respect to the latter option, an aspect of the agenda 
here might be, as I have suggested earlier, to interrogate the techniques 
and goals of account ability, accomplished via legal mechanisms, of those 
institutions involved in financial market pension provision, and indeed to 
reinvigorate wider discourses of account ability than are countenanced by 
a focus on risk management (Valverde et al., 1999). Another, broader 
possibility is to render explicit the connections between the distribution of 
pension provision by means of the market, and questions of just how 
pension contributions to mutual funds, pension funds and the CPP fund are 
invested. As Blackburn points out, the murkiness of this connection at 
present is in part due to the private law norms that govern investment by 
these institutions (1999: 6–7, 36–8). Although the preremptory way in which 
 NAC’s proposal for ‘ethical investment criteria’ was dismissed in the CPP 
debate may not augur well for this endeavour in Canada, it is a central 
component of a contemporary feminist analysis of pensions. 
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1. This project, funded by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council and based at Osgoode Hall Law School’s Institute of Feminist Legal 
Studies, is entitled ‘Feminism, Law and the Challenge of Privatization’. 
2. The programme in fact represents a cluster of three benefits: (1) Old Age 
Security (OAS), based on age (65 years) and years of residence in Canada; (2) 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), providing additional benefits to those 
with low incomes, with the benefits payable varying with marital status; and (3) 
 Spouse’s Allowance, providing further benefits to those who are spouses of 
OAS recipients, or survivors aged 60 to 64 years. 
3. Note that CPP also pays disability benefits to those of pre-retirement age who 
are eligible. 
4. Statistics Canada does not use the benchmark of ‘poverty line’, but rather the 
term ‘low income’. This is defined as spending at least 20 percent more of 
pretax income than the Canadian average on food, shelter and clothing. 
5. Participation in employer-based pension funds will not be dealt with in this 
article. The salient points here, according to Townson (1997: 30–40) are that as 
nonstandard work increases, employer-based pension coverage is declining, 
and the coverage of women workers is, accordingly, lower than that of men. 
6. According to the Consultations Secretariat, these consultations were held 
between 15 April and 10 June 1996 in 33 sessions held in 18 cities. 
7. Time out of the paid labour force to raise children under the age of seven and 15 
percent of the lowest earning years can be dropped out of the calculation of the 
‘contributory period’ on which benefits are based. 
8. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15. This reconsideration has 
resulted in the passage in June 2000 of a Federal Modernization of Benefits and 
Obligations Act (S.C. 2000, c.12). Among other changes, this extends the 
survivor and pension-sharing benefits of CPP to ‘commonlaw partners’, 
defined as ‘a person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal 
relationship’ and who has so cohabited ‘for a continuous period of at least 
one year’. 
9. This change was apparently made to bring CPP ‘in line with the majority of 
private plans’. 
10. The list of women’s organizations who participated in the public consultations 
 about CPP included the Manitoba Action Committee on the Status of Women, 
British Columbia Farm Women’s Network , National Association of Women 
and the Law, Northwest Territories Status of Women, Yukon Status of Women, 
Manitoba Women’s Advisory Council, the Older Women’s Network Metro 
Toronto and Area Council, Disabled Women’s Network , and l’Association 
feminine d’education et d’action sociale. 
11. While the investment figure stands at C$11.9 million (as of March 1999), the 
Board is expected to receive C$66 billion of funds over the next 10 years. 
12. These investment managers, Toronto Dominion Bank and Barclays Global 
Investors Canada Ltd were chosen in March 1999. 
13. However, in December 1999 a federal/provincial review of the CPP approved 
a shift to ‘active management’ of 50 percent of the fund. 
14. Regulation of mutual funds in Canada is provincially based, with the main body 
of governing legislation located in provincial Securities Acts. 
15. These competing visions have manifested themselves in the past in difficulties 
for Canadian feminist activists in developing a consistent position on pension 
reform (Vickers et al., 1993). 
 
C ASES C ITE D 
 
In the Matter of DeLellis, Kennedy and the Height of Excellence Planning Group 
[1998] 21 OSCB 305 
Hodgkinson v. Simms [1994] 3 S. C. R. 377 
In the Matter of Frank Mersch [1998] 21 OSCB 3805 
Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General) [1998] 38 O. R.(3d) 577 
 
 REFERE N C ES 
 
Battle, Ken (1996) ‘Summary’, pp. 1–16 in Experts’ Forum on Canada Pension Plan 
Reform. Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy. 
Beck, Ulrich (1992) Risk Society. London : Sage. 
Blackburn , Robin (1999) ‘The New Collectivism: Pension Reform, Grey Capitalism 
and Complex Socialism’, New Left Review 233: 1–65. 
Brodie, Janine (1997) ‘MesoDiscourses, State Forms and the Gendering of Liberal 
Democratic Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies 1(2): 223–42. 
Bromley, Daniel (1997) ‘Rethinking Markets’. Addr ess to the annual meeting of the 
American Agricultural Econom ics Association, Toronto , July. Unpub lished. 
Condon ,  Mary  (1996)  ‘Alternative  Account abilities:  Examples  from  Securities 
Regulation’, pp. 239–67 in P. Stenning (ed.) Accountability for Criminal Justice. 
Toronto : University of Toronto Press 
Cooper, Davina (1997) ‘Fiduciary Government: Decentring Property and Taxpayers’ 
Interests’, Social & Legal Studies 6(2): 235–57. 
Cossman, Brenda (forth coming) ‘Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and NeoConservative 
Visions of the Reprivatization Project’, paper prepared for project ‘Feminism, 
Law and the Challenge of Privatization’. 
Cotterrell, Roger (1995) Law’s Community. Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Deaton, Richard (1989) Political Economy of Pensions. Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press. 
Dickinson, Paul (1996) ‘Six Common Misperceptions about the Canada Pension 
Plan’, pp. 171–220 in When We’re 65. Toronto : CD Howe Institute. 
Donnelly, Maureen (1993) ‘The Disparate Impact of Pension Reform on Women’, 
 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 6: 419–54. 
England, Paula (1993) ‘The Separate Self: Ando centric Bias in Neoclassical 
Assumptions’, pp. 37–53 in M. Ferber and J. A. Nelson (eds) Beyond 
Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Ericson, Richard and Kevin Haggerty (1997) Policing the Risk Society. Toronto : 
University of Toronto Press. 
Esping-Anderson, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Fazio, Hugo and Manuel Riesco (1997) ‘The Chilean Pension Fund  Associations’, 
New Left Review 223: 90–100. 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP Consultations Secretariat (1996a) Report on the 
Canada Pension Plan Consultations. Ottawa: Department of Finance. 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Governments of Canada (1996b) Information Paper for 
Consultations on the Canada Pension Plan. Ottawa: Department of Finance. 
Ferber, Marianne A. and Julie A. Nelson (eds) (1993) Beyond Economic Man: 
Feminist Theory and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Fraser, Nancy (1998) ‘Social Justice’, Tanner Lectures on Human Values 19: 1–67. 
Gordon , Robert  (1987) ‘Unfreezing Legal Reality:  Critical Approaches to  Law’, 
Florida State University Law Review 15: 195. 
Guest, Dennis (1980/97) The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (3rd edn). 
Vancouver: UBC Press. 
House of Commons (1997a) Debates of the House of Commons of Canada (Hansard) 
36th Parliament, 1st Session, Monday, 6 October. 
House of Commons (1997b) Debates of the House of Commons of Canada (Hansard) 
36th Parliament, 1st Session, Monday, 24 November. 
 House of Common s (1997c) Debates of the House of Common s of Canada (Hansard) 
36th Parliament, 2nd Session, Thursday, 4 December. 
House of Common s (1997d) Standing Committee on Finance. Evidence. 5 November. 
House of Common s (1997e) Standing Committee on Finance. Evidence. 18 
November, online: Parliamentary Internet http:// www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom 
Doc/36/1/ 
FI NA/Meetings/Evidence/finaev47-e.htm 
House of Common s (1997f) Standing Committee on Finance. Evidence. 19 
November, online: Parliamentary Internet http:// www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom 
Doc/36/1/ FI NA/Meetings/Evidence/finaev54-e.htm 
Hunt, Alan (1999) ‘Legal Governance and Social Relations’, Report for the Law 
Commission of Canada on Law and Governance Relationships. 
Leonard, Peter and Barbara Nichols (1994) ‘Introduction: The Theory and Politics of 
Aging’, pp. 1–16 in P. Leonard and B. Nichols (eds) Gender, Aging and the 
State. Montreal: Black Rose. 
McDaniel, Susan A. (1997) ‘Serial Employment and Skinny Government: Reforming 
Caring and Sharing Among Generations’, Canadian Journal on Aging 16: 
465–84. 
MacDonald, Martha (1998) ‘Gender and Social Security Policy: Pitfalls and 
Possibilities’, Feminist Economics 4(1): 1–25. 
McCarthy, Shawn (1999) ‘Tax Act to Recognize Same-sex Couples’, Globe and Mail, 
29 March. 
McDonald, Lynn (1997a) ‘Editorial: Pension Questions that Are Politically Out-of 
the Question’, Canadian Journal on Aging 16: 393–406. 
McDonald, Lynn  (1997b)  Widowhood  and  Retirement:  Women  on  the  Margin. 
Toronto : Centre for Applied Social Research. 
 Miller, Peter and Nikolas Rose (1990) ‘Governing Economic Life’, Economy and 
Society 19: 1–31. 
O’Malley, Pat (1992) ‘Risk, Power and Crime Prevention’, Economy and Society 21: 
252–75. 
O’Malley, Pat, Lorna Weir and Clifford Shearing (1997) ‘Governmentality, criticism, 
politics’, Economy and Society 26: 501–17. 
Orloff, Ann O. (1993) ‘Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The 
Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States’, American 
Sociological Review 58: 303–28. 
Pearce, Frank and Steve Tombs (1996) ‘Hegemony, Risk and Governance: ‘Social 
Regulation’ and the American Chemical Industry’, Economy and Society 25: 
428–54. 
Pesando, James (1997) From Tax Grab to Retirement Saving: Privatizing the CPP 
Premium Hike. Toronto : CD Howe Institute. 
Philipps, Lisa (forth coming) ‘Taxing Women’s Unpaid Work: The Reprivatization of 
Social Reproduction’, Paper prepared for project ‘Feminism, Law and the 
Challenge of Privatization’. 
Rittich, Kerry (1998) Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender and Distribution in the 
Legal Structure of Market Reform. SJD Thesis, Harvard Law School. 
Robson, Bill (1996) ‘Keeping Mistakes “ Honest”: A Plea for Straight Talk about the 
CPP’, Experts’ Forum on Canada Pension Plan Reform. Ottawa: Caledon 
Institute of Social Policy. 
Rose, Nikolas (1996) ‘The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of 
Government’, Economy and Society 25: 327–56. 
Senate (1997) Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce. 
Examination of the Present State of the Financial System in Canada – 
 Evidence. 20 November, online: Parliamentary Internet http:// 
www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/bank-e/05eva-e.htm 
Sohrab, Julia (1996) Sexing the Benefit: Women, Social Security and Financial 
Independence in EU Sex Equality Law. Dartmouth : Aldershot. 
Statistics Canada (1995) Women in Canada: A Statistical Report. Ottawa: Minister of 
Industry. 
Stromberg, Glorianne (1995) Regulatory Strategies for the Mid-90s. 
Recommendations for Regulating Investment Funds in Canada. Toronto : 
Ontario Securities Commission. 
Stromberg, Glorianne (1998) Investment Funds in Canada and Consumer Protection. 
Ottawa: Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Canada. 
Townson, Monica (1995) Women’s Financial Futures: MidLife Prospects for a Secure 
Retirement. Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. 
Townson, Monica (1996) ‘What is the Problem?’, Experts’ Forum on Canada Pension 
Plan Reform. Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy. 
Townson, Monica (1997) Non-Standard Work: The Implications for Pension Policy 
and  Retirement  Readiness.  Ottawa:  Women’s  Bureau,  Human  Resources 
Development Canada. 
Valverde, Mariana, Ron Levi, Clifford Shearing, Mary Condon and Pat O’Malley 
(1999) ‘Democracy in Governance: A Socio-Legal Framework’, Report for the 
Law Commission of Canada on Law and Governance Relationships. 
Vickers, Jill, Pauline Rankin and Christine Appelle (1993) Politics as if Women 
Mattered. Toronto : University of Toronto Press. 
Waring, Marilyn (1988/90) If Women Counted. A New Feminist Economics. San 
Francisco: HarperCollins. 
Young, Claire F. L. (1997) ‘Public Taxes, Privatizing Effects, and Gender Inequality’, 
 pp. 307–29 in S. Boyd (ed.) Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, 
Law and Public Policy. Toronto : University of Toronto Press. 
Young, Claire F. L. (1999) ‘ “Aging and Retirement are Not Unique to 
Heterosexuals”: Rosenberg v. Canada’, Feminist Legal Academics Workshop 
Conference, Sydney, Australia, 24–26 February. 
